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Truth in Art, and Erik Satie’s Judgement
Peter Dayan
University of Edinburgh
Il est d’usage de croire qu’il y a une Vérité en Art. Je ne cesserai de le répéter – même 
à haute voix: «Il n’y a pas de Vérité en Art.» Soutenir le contraire n’est qu’un mensonge 
– & ce n’est pas beau de mentir … C’est pour cela que je n’aime pas les Pontifes*: ils 
sont par trop menteurs – de plus, je les crois un peu bêtes (si j’ose dire).
Erik Satie
(Pensée pour Fanfare)
* J’entends par Pontifes tous ces beaux messieurs qui «pontifient». On les reconnaît 
à leur air sérieux.1
It is certainly true that Satie, in his later years, did not tire of repeating that there 
is ‘no Truth in Art’; and in saying so, he was doubtless very much in tune with the 
spirit of his artistic milieu, which included, after all, such aesthetic anarchists as 
Picabia and Tzara, as well as the great artistic revolutionaries of the time, Picasso 
and Stravinsky, for whom he had unbounded admiration. And every time he 
did so, he was careful to attribute the erroneous belief that there is a Truth in 
Art to that class of writers whom he variously called ‘critiques’, ‘pédagogues’, 
‘Pontifes’, ‘pions’:2 people of the serious persuasion, who think it is possible to 
teach or describe what makes a piece of art good or bad. Attacks against this 
tribe are, in fact, the staple of Satie’s writings. It might appear sensible to infer 
from this that it would be foolish for a critic to look for Truth in Erik Satie’s 
writings about art. Nonetheless, that is what I shall be doing in this article. I shall 
I am grateful to the AHRC for the Research Leave Award which has enabled me to pursue 
my research on Satie’s writing.
 ‘It is the done thing to believe that there is a Truth in Art. I shall not desist from 
repeating – even out loud – that: “There is no Truth in Art.” To maintain the contrary is but 
a lie – and it is not nice to tell lies … That is why I do not like Pontiffs*: they tell too many 
lies – and furthermore, I think they are a little stupid (if I may say so).
Erik Satie
(A thought for Fanfare)
 * By Pontiffs, I mean all the fine gentlemen who ‘pontificate’. They may be identified 
       by their air of seriousness.’
Erik Satie, Ecrits, réunis par Ornella Volta (Paris: Editions Champ libre, 1981): 46. Many 
of the texts in Volta’s invaluable collection of Satie’s writings have been published in 
English translation, for example in: Erik Satie, A Mammal’s Notebook, ed. Ornella Volta, 
trans. Antony Melville (London: Atlas Press, 1996); or The Writings of Erik Satie, ed. and 
trans. Nigel Wilkins (London: Eulenburg Books, 1980). However, there is no volume in 
English that includes all the texts I quote. I have therefore provided my own translations. 
All italics and bold within quotations are in the originals.
 More on this word in n. 19, below.
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argue that, while there may, for Satie, be no truth in art, there are truths about 
art, susceptible of at least indirect expression, which Satie himself maintained 
with remarkable adroitness. Whether those truths are peculiar to the aesthetics 
of Satie’s writings; whether they are relevant to the way we might appreciate his 
music; and whether they have echoes in the thought of his artistic companions 
(especially those mentioned above) – these are questions that will remain open; 
but I would like at least to suggest that they are worth asking.
It is so rare to find in Satie’s public writings an argument of traditional, rational, 
positive form, maintained and repeated apparently without irony or antiphrasis, 
that one cannot but be struck by his echoing of one of the key concepts of late 
nineteenth-century aesthetics: that a historical study of music proves there is no 
unchanging definition, accessible to criticism or to pedagogy, of what music is. 
Satie uses this relativist argument in order to deny the right of critics to measure 
new music by old yardsticks. It can be found in almost all his writings about 
contemporary composers; and it becomes most insistent precisely when he 
is most concerned to assert that there is no Truth in Art. An example from an 
introduction he wrote for a concert of new music in Vienna in 1922:
Or – (et je ne saurais trop le répéter): … il n’y a pas de Vérité en Art … Vis-à-vis de 
Beethoven, … Bach n’est pas la Vérité; … vis-à-vis de Chopin … Rameau n’est pas 
la Vérité … L’Immortalité les a unis, … fondus, … associés …
Tous sont dans la Vérité, … au même titre, … au même degree …
… La Vérité???
Ils ont la leur … la leur propre … Ce qui n’est pas trop mal … pas mal du tout.
 En Art … s’il y avait une Vérité … Vérité Unique … depuis longtemps, … elle 
serait tellement fixée, … qu’il serait impossible à l’artiste d’employer une autre 
technique, … d’exprimer d’autres sensations, … de traiter d’autres sujets que ceux 
monopolisés par cette Vérité …3
But is Satie saying, here, that there is no Truth in Art, or that there are multiple 
truths? The bald statement ‘il n’y a pas de Vérité en Art’ seems to imply the 
former. However, the following lines suggest, rather, that each composer only 
seems not to be the truth when judged by criteria appropriate to other composers. 
Considered in himself (for all the composers Satie lists, here and in comparable 
contexts, are male), each composer does have a truth: his own truth; and each 
composer may be seen as ‘dans la Vérité’, provided that we are prepared to accept 
that the truth is not the same for each. Bach, then, is not the truth when faced 
 Satie, Ecrits, 96. ‘But the fact is – (and I cannot repeat it too often): … there is no 
Truth in Art … Compared with Beethoven, … Bach is not the Truth; … compared with 
Chopin … Rameau is not the Truth … Immortality has united them … blended them … 
associated them …
Each has attained the Truth, … in the same sense, … to the same degree …
… The Truth???
They have their own … each has his own … Which isn’t bad … not bad at all.
In Art … if there were a Truth … a Single Truth … it would have been so well 
established, … for a long time now, … that it would be impossible for an artist to use 
any technique, … to express any sensations, … to treat any subjects, … other than those 
monopolized by this Truth … .’
93Dayan: Truth in Art, and Erik Satie’s Judgement
with Beethoven; but doubtless he would be the truth when faced with Bach. The 
true moral of the music-history tale would be, not that there is no truth, but that 
there is no single truth, no ‘Vérité Unique’, applicable to all.
Satie’s second article on Stravinsky begins with a very similar combination 
of elements. First, we have the affirmation that there is no ‘Vérité en Art’. And 
then the generalizing ‘Vérité’ is replaced by ‘Vérité unique’ – leaving open the 
possibility of multiple truths; a possibility confirmed by the implication that 
each great composer has his own truth.
J’ai toujours dit – & je le répéterai encore très longtemps après ma mort – qu’il n’y 
a pas de Vérité en Art (de Vérité unique, s’entend).
La Vérité de Chopin – ce prodigieux créateur – n’est pas celle de Mozart, ce si 
luxueux musicien dont l’écriture est un éblouissement impérissable … .4
If each composer’s truth is different, is there anything that they all have in 
common? Should the answer be ‘no’, then it might be feared that the very identity 
of music, its unity as a concept, would fall apart. That threat to the unity of art was 
at the heart of Dada; which was certainly part of its well-documented attraction 
for Satie.5 And yet, in this article as always when discussing music he approves 
of, Satie sidesteps the threat, without confronting it, and almost surreptitiously 
restores the singularity, the unity of music, by attributing a distinguishing 
characteristic to all true composers; a characteristic which, by implication and 
association, attaches also to music itself, and becomes inseparable from all 
musical truths. It is timelessness; or immortality. That which unites Beethoven, 
Bach, Chopin and Rameau is ‘l’Immortalité’; Mozart’s writing will never cease 
to dazzle; and the conclusion of the second article on Stravinsky (from which I 
quote at the beginning of this article) similarly, if one reads between the lines, 
supposes the existence of a timeless canon of great musicians:
Je ne sais ce que je suis, mais ce que je sais, c’est que l’homme dont je viens de vous 
entretenir est un des plus grands musiciens qui aient jamais existé.
 Ibid., 61. ‘I have always said – & shall continue to repeat it long, long after my death 
– that there is no Truth in Art (no single Truth, that is).
The Truth of Chopin – that prodigious creator – is not the Truth of Mozart, that 
luxurious musician whose writing dazzles unendingly … .’
 Michel Sanouillet’s Dada à Paris, édition nouvelle, revue, remaniée et augmentée par Anne 
Sanouillet (Paris: CNRS, 2005) gives a balanced perspective on Satie’s relationship to the 
historical Dada movement. He was central to its activities only for a short time, in the early 
months of 1922, when he presided with obvious glee over the meeting of Dadaists that 
effectively excommunicated Breton and his ‘Congrès de Paris’ (see n. 18 below). But his 
affinities with Dada were long lasting and profound. As Sanouillet says (ibid., 155), many 
of his pre-war writings, including Le Piège de Méduse (first performed in 1913 or early 1914, 
though not published until 1921, by the Editions de la Galerie Simon, in Paris), clearly 
belong to the pre-history of the Dada movement; and his last ballet, Relâche, just as clearly 
resuscitated in 1924 the spirit of Dada, after the movement’s demise as an active force.
 ‘I know not what I am, but what I do know is this: the man about whom I have been 
talking to you is one of the greatest musicians who has ever existed.
May the name of Stravinsky be acclaimed!’
Que le nom de Strawinski soit acclamé! (65)6
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So on the one hand, there is no unique truth in art. But on the other hand, we are, 
apparently, to believe that certain artists have a truth, and that this renders them 
and their art truly immortal – or rather (and the distinction is not unimportant), 
we are to believe that Erik Satie feels sure he knows that certain artists have a 
truth, and that this renders them and their art truly immortal. This apparent 
contradiction would place Satie firmly straddling the great fence that Dada 
helped to construct: the fence that separates idealist concepts of art from a 
modernity defined by its refusal of absolute values. My aim, in this article, is to 
show that this is indeed Satie’s position, and that it is not as uncomfortable as it 
might appear; or that Satie, if I may be allowed to indulge in an adjustment and a 
mixing of the metaphor, is a virtuoso tightrope-walker along the top of the fence 
that Dada built.
What, for Satie, are the distinctive features of Stravinsky’s truth? A critic’s natural 
instinct, I think, would be to look in Satie’s article, to see what ‘sui generis’ qualities 
he ascribes to Stravinsky. But the results of such an investigation are confusing. 
The implication that the great musician has his own personal truth is certainly 
accompanied by what might appear to be a description of the components of 
that truth:
Rien n’est livré au hasard, vous dis-je. Où a-t-il puisé sa somptueuse «Vérité»?
 Voyez en lui un logicien remarquable, sûr & énergique; car il est le seul qui ait 
écrit avec une aussi magnifique puissance, une aussi certaine assurance, une aussi 
constante volonté.7
These are qualities fairly generally invoked, from the late Romantic period on, as 
characteristic of great artists of all kinds and periods. Would we be surprised to 
find Bach described as a remarkable logician? Or indeed Rameau, who, as Satie 
knew, applied logic to music with noteworthy persistence? And would it not have 
been perfectly acceptable to say that Beethoven wrote with magnificent power 
and constant strength of will? We will shortly see the adjective ‘somptueuse’ 
applied to a Beethoven symphony (his tenth). I think, furthermore, that it would 
be easy enough to imagine Satie saying similar things about Picasso. In short, 
these brief indications are too close to the general stereotype of the Great Artist 
to provide a real indication of the peculiar nature of Stravinsky’s own personal 
and distinctive ‘somptueuse «Vérité»’. Has Satie, then, rather than describing 
Stravinsky’s truth, allowed himself to define the truth of art in general? But as 
we know, he refuses to allow the possibility of such a definition; and he certainly 
never asserts that he has provided one. In fact, Satie, here as in all his writings 
on musicians, carefully maintains a certain vagueness, simply by omitting to 
say what kind of truth he is talking about. The ‘scare quotes’ around the word 
‘Vérité’ in the above quotation show that he knows he has got dangerously close 
to the critical point where he might have to commit himself; he quickly takes 
avoiding action.
Satie, in other words, cannot maintain for long that there is no truth of any 
sort in art. Almost as soon as he banishes the old-fashioned single unique truth 
 Satie, Ecrits, 64. ‘Nothing is left to chance, I tell you. Whence does he draw his 
sumptuous “Truth”’?
You should see in him a remarkable logician, precise and energetic; for he alone has 
written with such magnificent power, such ‘unmistakeable’ confidence, such constant 
strength of will.’
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of art, he finds that a personal truth, unique to each artist, fills the vacuum. 
Unfortunately, personal truths in art have a distressing tendency to presuppose 
roots in an absolute truth … to dodge this uncomfortable issue, Satie rapidly 
switches register. He ascribes all reflection on truth in art to the domain of 
criticism, which he rejects wholesale; and he confines himself to another order of 
truth, a merely descriptive order:
je dois vous annoncer loyalement que je ne me livrerai à aucune critique, me 
contentant de vous faire une sorte de description du splendide et féerique talent 
qui est déployé dans cet œuvre.8
This contrast between criticism and description, the former refused and the latter 
accepted by Satie, expresses a constant in his writing.
Criticism, to Satie, is a positive discourse. It is in harmony with the spirit of 
the scientific age so clearly formulated by Auguste Comte: ‘le véritable esprit 
positif consiste surtout à voir pour prévoir, à étudier ce qui est, afin d’en conclure 
ce qui sera, d’après le dogme général de l’invariabilité des lois naturelles’9 (‘the 
true positive spirit consists above all in seeing in order to foresee, in studying what 
is, in order to conclude therefrom what will be, according to the general doctrine 
of the invariability of natural laws’). Criticism, to align itself with this dogma, 
seeks to establish invariable artistic laws, and to use them to prescribe what, 
in art, should happen next. Hence it becomes normative and prescriptive. Satie 
therefore rejects it energetically. Description, on the other hand, is acceptable 
to him because it implies no judgement, no prescription, and no reference to 
invariable laws. However, for that very reason, because it refuses to concern 
itself with invariable laws, Satie’s description is of no help at all in understanding 
rationally why some composers are immortal, why some have a truth while 
others do not. It suggests but refuses to address the question of whether truths 
in art are personal or universal. And this is not an inadequacy or omission in 
Satie’s discourse. On the contrary: it is a point on which he takes a principled 
stand. Satie’s principle is that the question of whether truths in art are personal 
or universal must not be addressed positively.
I think it is possible to maintain, taking the long perspective, that the only 
proper end of writing about music, for Satie, is to persuade us that we actually 
believe in personal yet immortal musical truths. This belief is irrational, and 
cannot be supported by critical analysis of the truths concerned. It appears to 
conflict with Satie’s principle that we should not believe in a unique truth. It also 
conflicts, more directly, with the dominant ideological trends of his (and perhaps 
our) time; not only the scientific, but also, as we shall see, the anti-idealistic. 
Satie’s unique and extraordinary writing style is designed to profit from those 
conflicts: to allow science, anti-idealism and the refusal of unique truth their 
positive due, to give them victory in the field of the rational, precisely so that he 
can make plain the boundaries of that field, and suggest the existence of another, 
inaccessible to the positive; a second field where an irrational faith in the artist’s 
personal immortal truth can survive.
 Ibid., 63. ‘I shall frankly confess to you that I will engage in no critical activity; I will 
merely give you a sort of description of the splendid, the enchanting talent which unfolds 
in these works.’
 Auguste Comte, Discours sur l’esprit positif (Paris: Vrin, 1995): 74. The work was first 
published in 1844.
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Satie’s articles on Stravinsky, together with his essay on Debussy and his various 
introductions to concerts of music by his friends, belong to a distinctive genre in 
his writing. In these texts, he is speaking in support of composers he respected; 
and he does so apparently without irony (irony, in these circumstances, being 
reserved for the tribe of critics). Elsewhere, however, when he is not defending 
his fellows, his style usually appears constantly ironical. One senses that there 
are many layers to the irony; but it is not initially obvious how many layers there 
are, or what Satie’s own opinion (if any) might be. One fine example of this is 
his magnificent ‘Eloge des Critiques’ (‘In Praise of Critics’) (77–80). Another is 
‘Parfait Entourage’ (‘Ideal Companions’), which begins thus:
Vivre au centre d’œuvres glorieuses de l’Art est une des plus grandes joies qui 
se puissent ressentir. Parmi les précieux monuments de la pensée humaine que 
la modestie de ma fortune m’a fait choisir pour partager ma vie, je parlerai d’un 
magnifique faux Rembrandt, profond et large d’exécution, si bon à presser du bout 
des yeux, comme un fruit gras, trop vert.10
Can we take seriously Satie’s praise of a forgery? The peculiar analogy between 
the painting and a perhaps underripe yet visually attractive fruit might suggest 
a negative answer … but perhaps, at least before we pause to think too much 
about that analogy, we might have hoped that we could. After all, could it not 
be possible that a forger or an anonymous painter might have produced a 
masterpiece? in which case, might Satie not be mocking those who think that the 
signature and price-tag are what determine the value of a painting? But our faith 
in this argument fades as, going through the list of his apocryphal possessions, 
Satie turns to his favourite:
un faux manuscrit de Beethoven – sublime symphonie apocryphe du maître 
– acheté pieusement par moi, il y a dix ans, je crois.
 Des œuvres du grandiose musicien, cette 10e symphonie, encore ignorée, est 
une des plus somptueuses. Les proportions en sont vastes comme un palais; les 
idées en sont ombreuses et fraîches; les développements en sont précis et justes.
 Il fallait que cette symphonie existât: le nombre 9 ne saurait être beethovénien. 
Il aimait le système décimal: «J’ai dix doigts», expliquait-il.11
To find this unbelievable, ridiculous, we do not need to wait for the strange 
analogies and the mock justifications.
We can accept that a painting well executed in Rembrandt’s style might look, 
even to an expert, like a genuine Rembrandt; but anyone who thinks they have 
an ear for such things cannot believe that a symphony in Beethoven’s late style 
0 Satie, Ecrits, 20. ‘To live surrounded by Art’s glorious works is one of the greatest 
joys that can be felt. Amongst the precious monuments of human thought that the modesty 
of my means has led me to choose as my life’s companions, I shall mention a magnificent 
false Rembrandt, profound and of sweeping execution, so delicious when squeezed with 
the tips of one’s eyes, like some rich fruit, too green.’
 Ibid. ‘A false Beethoven manuscript – a sublime apocryphal symphony by the 
master – piously purchased by me, ten years ago, I believe.
Of the grandiose musician’s works, this tenth symphony, which remains unknown, is 
one of the most sumptuous. Its proportions are as vast as those of a palace; its ideas are 
cool and shady; its developments are precise, judicious, exact.
This symphony had to exist; the number 9 could not be Beethovenian. He liked the 
decimal system: “I have ten fingers”, he would explain.’
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could fool us for a moment. In 1996, the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York 
held an exhibition entitled ‘Rembrandt / Not Rembrandt’, showing the paintings 
in its considerable collection that were by Rembrandt according to some experts, 
and not by Rembrandt according to others; these paintings outnumbered those 
Rembrandts whose attribution remained uncontested. One certainly cannot 
imagine anything comparable happening with the symphonies of Beethoven. The 
strength of our belief in the ineffably unique and utterly unmistakeable quality 
of Beethoven (especially late Beethoven) can be gauged by the presentation 
of Barry Cooper’s realization of sketches by Beethoven as part of, precisely, a 
tenth symphony. The universal consensus among musicologists was that no 
such realization could ever really sound like Beethoven. In defending his work, 
Cooper maintained that it was pretty well indistinguishable analytically from 
Beethoven; but he accepted that it nonetheless obviously lacked a certain quality 
that, precisely, escapes analysis.12 In short, just as in Satie’s day, Beethoven’s je ne 
sais quoi was held to be as instantly recognizable as it was indefinable. The first 
of Satie’s prized forgeries, then, is attributed to the most imitated of painters, the 
second to the composer deemed most inimitable; and this enables Satie’s irony to 
strike at the very heart of the our beliefs concerning imitation.
As always, the key to understanding that irony is an appreciation of the strategy 
that Ornella Volta, following Vladimir Jankélévitch, calls ‘conformisme ironique’ 
(‘ironic conformism’) (269).13 Satie imitates the discourse of the pontificator, he 
apes seriousness, but always with a twist that throws into relief an irrational 
presupposition of the pontificating discourse. The critic thinks of himself as the 
purveyor of a serious truth; Satie’s irony shows that this seriousness is based 
on shaky foundations, for when we think about the reasons for which Satie’s 
proclamations are clearly ridiculous, we find that those same reasons and that 
same ridicule can be applied to the affirmations of the critic. In the process, Satie 
contests the status of the rational, of the serious and of the truth, in judging 
artistic productions. Analysis of Satie’s irony, therefore, must aim to pinpoint the 
irrational aspect of serious discourse that Satie highlights as he apes it. In this case, 
it is nothing more nor less than the supposition that there is a true, inimitable, 
and self-identical Beethovenian voice. Satie rubs our noses in the fact that we 
believe such a voice exists; if we did not, why would we find his appreciation of 
the tenth symphony so ludicrous? And yet at the same time, by starting from the 
less clear-cut case of Rembrandt, he reminds us that this conviction is, rationally 
speaking, questionable. What, and where, exactly, is the Beethovenian truth? Is it 
 See, for example, the frank exchange of views between Cooper and his critic 
Robert S. Winter in ‘Correspondence: Beethoven’s Tenth Symphony’, Journal of the Royal 
Musical Association 117/2 (1992): 324–30. ‘No doubt’, writes Cooper of his realization and 
completion, ‘it is a distorted view of Beethoven’s intentions’ (328). Hence, doubtless: 
‘A major question is whether the reconstruction actually sounds at all like Beethoven’ (326). 
To that question, Cooper does not presume to give an answer. But he does maintain that 
musicological analysis has generally failed to pinpoint the differences between his work 
and Beethoven’s. ‘Some critics have made the unsurprising claim that it is not as good; but 
their attempts to identify specific faults have been largely unsuccessful’ (326).
 Volta explains the concept more fully in: Erik Satie, Correspondance presque 
complète (Paris: Fayard/IMEC, 2003): 10. ‘Conformisme ironique’ is the title of a chapter in 
Jankélévitch’s book L’Ironie (Paris: Flammarion, 1964): 119–34, in which Jankélévitch writes, 
commenting on Satie’s Socrate: ‘L’ironie, nature composée, s’installe dans l’erreur, non pas 
pour la comprendre, mais pour la perdre’ (126–7) (‘Irony, whose nature is composite, aligns 
itself with error, not in order to understand it, but in order to lead it to its downfall’).
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simply to be equated with everything that Beethoven wrote? What if he had off 
days? would that mean that some of his work was less true to himself than the 
rest? but who would have the right to judge, to say what is truly Beethovenian? 
can we really afford to allow anyone to define the Beethovenian essence in a way 
that could be used as a serious critical (and diacritical) tool? Satie, in his usual 
manner (as inimitable as Beethoven’s), makes us uncomfortably aware of such 
difficulties by ignoring them too flagrantly. Not everyone, he admits, may find 
the apocryphal tenth symphony as obviously impressive as Beethoven’s other 
symphonies. But he refuses to take this as proof that the tenth symphony does 
not contain the true Beethovenian essence.
Venus pour absorber filialement ce chef-d’œuvre, de leurs oreilles méditatives 
et recueillies, quelques-uns, sans raison, crurent à une conception inférieure de 
Beethoven, et le dirent. Ils allèrent plus loin même.
 Beethoven ne peut être inférieur à lui-même, dans aucun cas. Sa technique 
et sa forme restent augurales, même dans l’infime. Le rudimentaire ne lui est 
applicable. Il ne s’intimide pas du contrefait imputé à sa personne artistique.14
This argument is so utterly irrational on the surface that it would be otiose for 
me to point out how. And yet if we are brave enough to allow ourselves to think 
about it, we might begin to suspect that it is no more irrational than the general 
supposition that Beethoven’s style is unmistakeable. Is it actually possible to 
determine, on internal musical grounds, with positive scientific certitude, which 
music is by him, and which is not? If it were, would that not mean we had found 
the Beethovenian recipe, and could therefore produce more Beethovenian music? 
In which case, we would no longer be able to determine, on internal musical 
grounds, which music is actually by Ludwig van Beethoven himself – or to put 
it another way: either the distinguishing features of Beethoven’s unique voice 
are susceptible of positive analysis, in which case they can be reproduced, and 
his voice ceases to be unique; or they are not susceptible to positive analysis, in 
which case it is impossible to demonstrate scientifically that an apocryphal work 
is not worth a work that is truly by him.
Of these two alternatives, Satie chooses the second, unfailingly and 
unambiguously. There is no possibility of analysing critically the unique voice, 
the individual composer’s personal truth; it is beyond the positive. It follows that 
if we believe that the unique voice, the personal truth, exists, our belief must be 
irrational. What distinguishes Satie from the critic is not that the former’s beliefs 
are rational and the latter’s irrational; both are irrational. It is that the critics 
take their beliefs as seriously as if they were rational, as if they were positive, 
and therefore gave them the right to be prescriptive; whereas Satie accepts 
that his beliefs cannot be positively justified, and allows the consequences of 
that irrationality to invade his writing. The first and most pervasive of those 
consequences is this: for Satie, judgement on all such matters must be arbitrary in 
form; it should be clear that it cannot be rationally justified, but can only depend 
on an unjustified faith.
 Satie, Ecrits, 20. ‘Of those who came filially to absorb this masterpiece, through 
their meditative and contemplative ears, some, without justification, thought it an inferior 
conception of Beethoven, and said so. They went still further.
Beethoven cannot be inferior to himself, in any circumstances. His technique and his 
form remain augural, even at the most minute scale. The rudimentary cannot apply to 
him. He is not to be intimidated by the counterfeit imputed to his artistic person.’
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Justified faith is the victim of the most sustained exercise in ‘conformisme 
ironique’ in the Satie corpus: the proclamations of the ‘Eglise Métropolitaine 
d’Art de Jésus Conducteur’ (‘Metropolitan Church of Art of Jesus Conductor’), 
or EMAJC for short. The normal register of its writings is that of the fulmination, 
the excommunication, the rant, always from a point of view of absolute authority, 
assumed to be incontestable, in the name of the Christian Church in general. This 
is plainly ridiculous simply because Satie had no such authority. I have said that 
analysis of Satie’s irony should aim to pinpoint the irrational aspect of serious 
discourse that Satie highlights as he apes it: the aspect of serious discourse that 
Satie apes here is simply the assumption of authority; in the first place by Joséphin 
Péladan and his esoteric fin-de-siècle ilk, but more widely by all churches.15 There 
is in fact not one unique church, just as there is no unique Truth in Art; so the 
claim of any church to universal authority is a perfect prey for Satie’s irony.
The ‘Cartulaire’, which was the official organ of the EMAJC, published in June 
1895 an ‘Oraison pour les Bons et contre les Méchants: athées, impies, libertins, 
orgueilleux, juifs déicides, hérétiques anglicans, francs-maçons simoniaques, et autres’ (121) 
(‘Prayer for the Good and against the Evil: atheists, the impious, libertines, the proud, 
deicidal Jews, heretical Anglicans, simoniacal freemasons, and others’). This list of the Evil 
corresponds reasonably closely (allowing for the parodic mode) to the usual targets 
of the increasingly virulent right-wing Catholic propaganda of the time – with one 
exception: rather than Protestants in general, Satie here specifies Anglicans. Why? I 
will allow myself to suggest a biographical explanation. Satie’s mother, Jean Leslie 
Anton, was an Anglican; and so was Satie himself – for six years. His mother had 
him baptized into the Anglican church. She died, however, in 1872; and his paternal 
grandparents, who had never approved of Jean Anton or of her religion and did not 
want a Protestant living in their house, quickly had little Eric rebaptized a Catholic. 
The ‘méchants’, therefore, would include Satie’s mother. Yet the ‘Oraison’ condemns 
her and her fellow Anglicans to burn at the stake:
Nous frapperons Vos Ennemis et Nous les étendrons à terre. Nous tarirons la 
source de leur rage, nous exterminerons leurs œuvres réprouvées; nous élèverons 
pour eux les bûchers de la Sainte-Inquisition, et leurs corps hideux se tordront 
dans la douleur, pour la meilleure purification de leurs âmes. Nous vous offrirons 
un holocauste, Seigneur, et la fumée vous en sera agréable.16
Should we be disturbed to find Satie stoking up for his mother the bonfires of 
the Inquisition? Not if we bear in mind the ironic nature of the entire EMAJC 
enterprise. In fact, Satie’s target, here, is not his mother, but the very discourse 
of condemnation. As ever, he attacks it by imitating its rationale, and pushing it 
 Steven Moore Whiting, in Satie the Bohemian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), shows how Péladan’s Rosicrucian sect was born and died in a milieu saturated 
with self-satire, where faith and hoax were never far apart. The context in which Whiting 
places Satie’s ironic style (its first spiritual home being the ‘Chat noir’ cabaret) makes it 
clear that to interpret the EMAJC as an ironic or satirical enterprise is entirely historically 
appropriate – provided one bears in mind that such satire, at the time, by no means meant 
straightforward rejection of the faith being satirized.
 Satie, Ecrits, 122. ‘We will strike Your Enemies and We will lay them prostrate on 
the ground. We will dry up the well-spring of their madness, we will exterminate their 
reprobate works; we will raise up for them the fires of the Holy Inquisition, and their 
hideous bodies will writhe in pain, for the better purification of their souls. We will offer 
up to you a holocaust, Lord, and its smoke will be agreeable to you.’
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too far. In his assertion of absolute authority, he invites scepticism; he is, in effect, 
opening himself to mockery. (As expected, the ‘Cartulaire’ attracted plenty of 
mockery and made no converts; in this as in so many other ways, Satie was 
indeed a dadaist ‘avant la lettre’.) His aim is to do this in such a way that the 
scepticism should attach itself not only to him personally, but also to those who 
speak like him.
It was this ironic assumption of the discourse of authoritative condemnation, 
in his role as Parcier of the EMAJC, that founded Satie’s discourse on art. He 
published nothing on any artistic topic before his EMAJC period, which dates 
from 1893 to 1895.17 After that, he had found his voice, and he never lost it again. 
What the EMAJC taught him was to produce a discourse that proclaimed, 
through attacks on outsiders, an unfounded authority. And the proclamation of 
unfounded authority remained, ever afterwards, the fundamental principle of 
Satie’s writings on all forms of art. Satie writes as a naked Emperor who points 
to his nakedness.
Before I go any further, I should make it clear that I am not suggesting Satie 
believed in neither art, nor religion. On the contrary. His scepticism is directed not 
at them, but at the ‘pontifes’ who would persuade us that they can demonstrate 
their authority in matters of art and religion. Satie’s unwavering conviction, in 
both spheres, was that their true value could and should only be affirmed, never 
demonstrated; and that his duty as a writer was double: to defend good art; and 
at the same time, to deny that he was being rational in doing so. In fulfilling 
this duty, he had to counter the bourgeois positivist philosophy of the critics by 
demonstrating, through ‘conformisme ironique’, that their aesthetic arguments 
were in fact as arbitrary as his own. However, in his later years, he also found 
himself obliged to steer around another reef, more dangerous because closer to 
home: anti-idealism.
In one sense, Dada marked an absolutely decisive moment in the history 
of discourse on aesthetics. Its founding principle was close to Satie’s: that all 
assertions of aesthetic authority were arbitrary. Dada, or more precisely Tristan 
Tzara, whom Satie knew and liked, would certainly have agreed with Satie 
that there is no Truth in Art; that it is ridiculous to try to say anything rational 
about what Art in general is; and that publicly inviting such ridicule was a 
positive service to the cause of Art, to the extent that the ridicule rubbed off, 
not only on the Dadaist, but also on all serious or positive notions of Art. In the 
confrontations between Tzara, whose refusal of serious doctrines was staunch, 
and Breton, who seemed to Satie dangerously close to seriousness as he headed 
towards surrealism, Satie always sided with Tzara.18 And to the extent that a 
 In Satie’s Ecrits as published by Ornella Volta, the only publications chronologically 
preceding the EMAJC are those that appeared in La Lanterne japonaise in 1888 and 1889, 
normally over the signature ‘Virginie Lebeau’. They are comic writings, typical of the ‘Chat 
Noir’ style described by Steven Moore Whiting (see n. 15, above). Not a single composer 
is mentioned in them – except for one Erik Satie, who figures in two of the articles, as a 
‘rude lapin’ (which one might roughly translate as ‘valorous gentleman’) and composer 
of Gymnopédies, the third of which, apparently, cured ‘Femme Lengrenage, Journalière 
à Précigny-les-Balayettes’ (‘Mistress Cogworks, Employed as a Daily at Foresign-under-
Shortbrush’) of a nasal polyp (113).
 The famous open letter dated 13 February 1922 to Comœdia, signed by Eluard, 
Ribemont-Dessaignes, Satie, and Tzara, condemning Breton’s apparent attempt to control 
the Dada movement, uses a revealing ecclesiastical analogy: ‘nous pensons qu’il est temps 
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modern consensus on these matters exists, I think we can say that Tzara has 
triumphed over Breton. We do not believe today, generally, that there is any 
point pursuing a general truth about what art is, even a surrealist one. Up to that 
point, I imagine that Satie would have been happy with his friend Tzara’s legacy. 
However, there is another point, equally essential, on which their aesthetics 
diverge; and it concerns not whether or not faith in art can be justified rationally 
(they agree that it cannot), but whether it is necessary.
Parmi les musiciens, il y a les pions & les poètes. Les premiers en imposent au 
public & à la critique. Je citerai comme exemples de poètes Liszt, Chopin, Schu-
bert, Moussorgsky; de pion,19 Rimsky-Korsakow. Debussy était le type du music-
ien poète. On trouve dans sa suite plusieurs types de musicien pions. (D’Indy, qui 
pourtant professe, n’en est pas un.)
 Le métier de Mozart est léger, celui de Beethoven lourd, ce que peu de gens 
peuvent comprendre; mais tous deux sont des poètes. Tout est là.20
It is indeed. This declaration is entirely contrary to the spirit of Dada (which 
was in the process of asserting itself in Paris as Satie published this article, 
in 1920) in one essential: Satie is clearly affirming that certain composers are 
genuinely artistic, and others are not; as if this were a timeless truth. He uses the 
same technique as Berlioz or Debussy to define ‘good’ musicians: analogy with 
poetry – a great musician is a poet. And to define ‘bad’ musicians, he assimilates 
them to ‘pions’, in other words to the tribe of those who think that music can 
be controlled. To emphasize the point, he expresses implicit astonishment that 
a teacher (Vincent d’Indy, who officiated at the Schola Cantorum, where Satie 
himself had been a student) should nonetheless turn out not to be a ‘pion’. This 
is entirely in accordance with all the other articles that Satie published in which 
he mentions contemporary musicians. He never changes his mind or contradicts 
himself on this point.
de mettre fin à ces histoires de papes, et de défendre notre liberté’ (‘we think that it is time 
to put an end to these papal manoeuverings, and to defend our freedom’) (Correspondance 
presque complète, 474).
 The word ‘pion’ is central to Satie’s discourse on music. It contains two opposing 
meanings. The primary sense one might render as something like ‘Surveillance Officer’: 
it properly designates someone (usually a student) employed in French schools, not to 
teach, but merely to keep order and to discipline pupils, in the playground and during 
study periods. ‘Pion’, however, also means a pawn, both on the chess-board and as 
someone manipulated by others. (Indeed, the ‘pion’ in school, while traditionally detested 
by pupils as a figure of authority, is also seen as someone of low status, at the bottom of 
the professional hierarchy.) A ‘pion’, then, is someone either controlled or controlling; and 
that very ambiguity focuses attention, not on what the ‘pion’ does, but on the fact that 
for him, control is what counts. Unable to find an English word that contains this dual 
meaning, I have kept the French word in the translation.
0 Satie, Ecrits, 45. ‘One can divide musicians into “pions” & poets. The former 
hoodwink the public & critics. Some examples of poets: Liszt, Chopin, Schubert, 
Moussorgsky. Rimsky-Korsakov is an example of a “pion”. Debussy was the type of the 
poet musician. Among his followers are to be found several types of the “pion” musician. 
(D’Indy, even though he teaches, is not one.)
Mozart’s musical language is light, Beethoven’s is heavy (not many people are able to 
understand this); but both are poets. Which is all that matters.’
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Satie’s list of ‘good’ musicians is exclusive. No one ever moves from the ‘bad’ 
category to the ‘good’. And on the rare occasions when musicians move from the 
‘good’ to the ‘bad’, it is never because Satie revises his opinion of the works he 
had appreciated; it is always (or so he would have us believe) because, having 
been corrupted by the ‘pion’ mentality, certain composers stopped composing 
the ‘good’ music of which they might have been capable, and started writing 
‘bad’ music.21 It follows that no dead composer can ever change category. Hence 
Satie can affirm that the ‘good’ musicians of the past are, for him, immortal. But 
for any good Dadaist, such notions of immortality, of essential poetic quality, are 
as much to be attacked as the concept of artistic truth in general.
One can gauge the distance between Satie and the true spirit of Dada by 
comparing their attitudes to the assimilation of art to mass production. For Dada, 
this assimilation is part of a general assault on all humbug, and a necessary 
corrective to the idealization of art. But for Satie, it was anathema:
Simple Question
Que préférez-vous:
La Musique ou la Charcuterie?
C’est une question, semble-t-il, qui devrait se poser au moment des hors-d’œuvre.
 Dans beaucoup de lieux, l’excellent et doux silence a été remplacé par de la 
mauvaise musique. Il est bien vu, par le commun, d’ouïr de fausses belles choses, 
d’écouter de sottes ritournelles, vaguement pieuses, en prenant un bock ou en 
essayant un pantalon … .
 Ouf! Tout cela est bien pénible pour un homme de mon âge; & j’étouffe de cette 
dufayêlisation musicale.
 Le remède? De formidables impôts; de terribles vexations; de sévères 
répressions. Des supplices, même.
 A-t-on le droit d’enlaidir froidement notre pauvre vie?22
 The clearest example is Georges Auric. In April 1921, Satie wrote an introduction to 
a concert of music by ‘les Six’ in which he names Auric, along with Poulenc and Milhaud, 
as representative of the latest musical tendencies, and describes himself as their friend. 
Unfortunately, three years later, Satie caught Auric (as well as Poulenc and Cocteau) hob-
nobbing in Monte Carlo with Louis Laloy, whom Satie had long detested as the most 
perniciously serious of music critics. Satie broke with Auric, Poulenc and Cocteau, and 
published more than one article in which he made plain his contempt. Auric mocked Satie 
mercilessly in return (although, as he recounts in his autobiography Quand j’étais là (Paris: 
Grasset, 1979): 21–33, he later repented). At the same time – was it a consequence, a cause, 
or a coincidence? – Auric’s music ceased to please Satie.
 Satie, Ecrits, 24–5. 
‘Simple Question
Which would you prefer:
Music or Sausages?
This is a question, I think, that should be asked as the hors d’œuvre is brought. In 
many establishments, silence, sweet and excellent silence, has been replaced by bad music. 
It has become fashionable, among the vulgar, to hear false fine sounds, to listen to foolish 
refrains, vaguely pious, as one quaffs a pint or tries on a pair of trousers … .
Sigh! all this is most distressing for a man of my age; & I am being suffocated by this 
musical dufayêlization.
The cure? Formidable taxes; terrible vexations; severe repression. Torture, even.
Have they the right coldly to suffuse with ugliness our poor life?’
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Ornella Volta, in a characteristically informative and perceptive note, explains 
the neologism ‘dufayêlization’ – and shows how it distances Satie from the 
painterly avant garde:
le Palais de la Nouveauté Dufayêl est le plus connu des grands magasins de 
l’époque. En tant que synonyme de production de série, il va servir inopinément 
de drapeau à tout artiste que aspire à briser l’ivoire de sa tour. Chez les cubistes, à 
la question «Veux-tu peindre comme le Louvre ou comme Dufayêl?», la réponse de 
rigueur est «comme Dufayêl, évidemment». – «Dufayêl me semble plus intéressant 
que Ribemont-Dessaignes», déclare Picabia, qui pourtant aime bien ce dernier … 
il faut bien dire qu’aucun de ces propos ne conviendrait à ES. C’est précisément 
pour échapper à la «dufayêlisation» musicale qu’il a essayé de limiter celle-ci à la 
«musique d’ameublement».23
The choice between music and ‘charcuterie’, like the contrast between furniture 
music and art music (or true music, or serious music), would have appeared very 
old-fashioned, indeed positively Romantic (or worse still, Symbolist) to any good 
Dadaist. It suggests belief in an essential difference between the beauty of true 
music, and the ugliness of false music, which is invading our lives; precisely the 
kind of essentialism that Dada was designed to destroy. And yet Satie generally 
managed to stay on the best of terms with Picabia (as well as with Picasso), 
and indeed Tzara and Ribemont-Dessaignes. Indeed, his happiest artistic 
collaborations were with Picasso and Picabia. This is not as bizarre as it might 
seem. Satie, as well as maintaining his old-fashioned belief in the immortality of 
music, beauty and great musicians, tirelessly, brilliantly, and to the applause of 
the spirit of Dada, demonstrated the ridiculousness of his own faith.
In his revolt against the assimilation of music to ‘charcuterie’, Satie proposes, 
as we have seen, a cure for those who have offended his aesthetic sensibility:
De formidables impôts; de terribles vexations; de sévères répressions. Des 
supplices, même.24
Vexations? Satie was himself the author of the most terrible musical vexation 
of all time. Vexations is a little one-minute piece that, on the manuscript, is 
accompanied by the following celebrated note:
Pour se jouer 840 fois de suite ce motif, il sera bon de se préparer au préalable, et 
dans le plus grand silence, par des immobilités sérieuses25
 Ibid, 243. ‘the Dufayêl Palace of Novelty was the most famous department store of 
the time. Being a synonym for mass production, it was pressed into service as a rallying-
point for any artist who sought to shatter the ivory of his tower. For a cubist, to the 
question “Would you like your painting to be as in the Louvre or as in Dufayêl?”, the 
correct answer was “As in Dufayêl, obviously.” – “Dufayêl seems to me more interesting 
than Ribemont-Dessaignes”, declared Picabia, much though he liked the latter … it must 
be said that such comments would not have suited ES. It was precisely in order to escape 
from musical “dufayêlisation” that he sought to limit it to “furniture music”. 
 Ibid., 24–5. ‘Formidable taxes; terrible vexations; severe repression. Torture, even.’
 ‘To play this motif to oneself 840 times in a row, it will be appropriate to prepare 
oneself beforehand, in the most profound silence, by serious immobilities’; see Robert 
Orledge’s exemplary article ‘Understanding Satie’s “Vexations”’, Music and Letters 79 
(Aug. 1998): 386–95, 387. The note, like the piece, was published posthumously.
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The abundant literature on this injunction is summed up in intriguing articles 
by Robert Orledge and Stephen Whittington.26 Opinion is divided on the effect 
and aesthetic implications of playing the piece 840 times (which takes between 
12 and 24 hours). Whittington suggests that it is, amongst other things, a study in 
musical boredom. He portrays it as a forerunner of the ‘musique d’ameublement’ 
to which Ornella Volta refers in the note quoted above: the ‘furniture music’, 
which Satie wrote more than two decades later, and which is similarly repetitive 
(though Satie did not specify the number of repetitions). However, as Whittington 
also acknowledges, despite the similarities, a distinction remains to be made 
between furniture music and Vexations. ‘Musique d’ameublement’ was, as Volta 
says, quite explicitly anti-art; it was music reduced to the level, precisely, of the 
department store, of the sausage-machine, to be churned out endlessly and not 
to be listened to; in short, it is music ‘as in Dufayêl’, and, to the artist, either 
irritating or comic. But in a strange way, in the end, Vexations is different:
Vexations is structured and notated to facilitate the cultivation and maintenance 
[sic] a mental state which Satie calls ‘serious immobility’. This is the view of John 
Cage, who observed that ‘the textual remarks in connection with the Vexations are 
not humorous; they are in the spirit of Zen Buddhism.’27
Robert Orledge has shown by careful musical analysis why Vexations is peculiarly 
well-adapted to this function, showing that the piece is actually designed to be 
unmemorable (so that even after playing it repeatedly, although it is so short, 
pianists still need the music in front of them), at the same time as being highly 
musically structured.28
Whittington continues:
The act of performing or listening to a complete performance of Vexations cannot be 
compared to any other musical experience. In Cage’s famous aphorism, ‘In Zen they 
say: If something is boring after two minutes, try it for four. If still boring, try it for 
eight, sixteen, thirty-two, and so on. Eventually one discovers that it’s not boring at 
all but very interesting.’ In a poetic29 sense, Vexations never finishes – the 840 repeti-
tions are themselves but an instant in the eternal present in which the music exists 
like some Platonic form, obliterating memory, eluding analysis. In the words of an 
ancient Indian saying, ‘The music continues; it is we who walk away.’30
Cage’s aphorism obfuscates an essential question. Could the extraordinary 
effect of Vexations be produced by the 840-fold repetition of absolutely anything 
boring? Or is the effect because of the peculiar and unique character of Erik 
Satie’s composition Vexations? Whittington’s own assertion that it ‘is structured 
and notated to facilitate the cultivation and maintenance’ of a certain mental 
state surely suggests the latter, as does Orledge’s analysis. To put this question 
 Stephen Whittington, ‘Serious Immobilities: On the Centenary of Erik Satie’s Vexations’, 
in Erik Satie: Compositeur de Musique (1999), www.af.lu.se/~fogwall/article3.html, accessed 8 
May 2009. Whittington’s article, as far as I know, is available only on this website.
 Ibid.
 Orledge, ‘Satie’s “Vexations”’.
 Whittington (‘Serious Immobilities’) here takes up Satie’s identification of the truly 
musical with the poetic. Perhaps no critical trope has been more contagious over the past 
two centuries than the definition of poetry as musical, and of music as poetic; it allows 
one to define neither.
0 Ibid.
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in perspective, it is worth comparing Satie’s work with the two pieces of musical 
Dadaism that Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes describes.31 One, ‘Pas de la chicorée 
frisée’ (‘Dance of the Curly Endive’), was composed by Ribemont-Dessaignes, 
for piano, by choosing notes and harmonies entirely at random. Performed at 
a ‘soirée Dada’ on 27 March 1920, it predictably provoked scandalized howls, 
whistles, and so on. The title doubtless owes something to the titles of Satie’s 
piano pieces, and Satie’s Parade had successfully provoked a comparable scandal, 
on a larger scale, three years earlier. Yet the essential difference remains: Parade, 
like the piano pieces, like Vexations, is very clearly not composed at random. Two 
months later, at a ‘festival Dada’ in the Salle Gaveau, a performance was given on 
the great pipe organ of ‘Le Pélican, un fox-trot à la mode, ce qui prenait figure de 
sarcasme’ (‘The Pelican, a fashionable foxtrot; this was taken as a sarcasm’).32 Satie 
was known for using fashionable dances in his music, including rags and tangos, 
and for quoting other people’s music; but once again, the difference is essential. 
Musical Dada refuses the act of deliberate musical composition, and contests 
it either through randomness, or through simple plagiarism. But Satie, though 
randomness and plagiarism have their place in his work, as part of the parodic 
refusal of Unique Truth in Art that allied him with Dada, also, deliberately, 
musically, composes with or around them.
To return to the torments that Satie (briefly resurrecting the thundering voice 
of the Parcier of the EMAJC) proposed to inflict on the Philistines who treat 
music like sausages: let us remember that these vexations are described not as a 
punishment, but as a cure, a ‘remède’. If we allow ourselves to imagine Vexations 
as the materialization of this cure, then we might say that it consists of listening 
to music that would be almost the same as sausage music or furniture music 
– almost, but not quite; for as well as becoming, in time, tediously repetitive, it 
might, if we give it the credit of our attention, make us suspect the possibility of 
composing something that could take us out of time and, in the process, put us 
in mind of the one unchanging truth about music that Satie allows his words to 
express: its immortality.
As Whittington says:
It is typical of Satie that the very words that make Vexations one of his most radical 
works also cast doubt on the seriousness of the piece. One cannot parody Vexa-
tions: it is so bizarre that it is already a parody of itself. Parody is characteristic of 
Satie’s work, and self-parody in particular. It goes beyond a self-mocking expres-
sion of Satie’s characteristic modesty and is elevated to an artistic method. Satie’s 
 Georges Ribemont-Dessaignes, Déjà jadis, ou Du mouvement Dada à l’espace abstrait 
(Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1973); see 100–106. This book, originally published 
in 1958, contains, as well as a fine pen-portrait of Satie in the days of Dada (156–7), a 
post-Dada musical aesthetic, in which one finds intact the fundamental principle of 
‘pure music’ as it had been formulated a century earlier: ‘Un Concerto Brandebourgeois 
de J.-S. Bach ne signifie rien et n’exprime rien qu’on puisse analyser avec des mots’ 
(‘A Brandenburg Concerto by J. S. Bach signifies nothing and expresses nothing that can 
be analysed in words’) (404). This statement demonstrates the survival (or the rebirth?) 
of the principle of ‘absolute music’ whose rationale and whose birth in the nineteenth 
century have been so well described by Daniel Chua in Absolute Music and the Construction 
of Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). On the one hand, Dada 
certainly highlighted the intellectual shakiness of the concept of absolute music; on the 
other hand, it seems to have done no lasting damage to that concept, even in the mind of 
the most musical of the core Dadaists.
 Ibid.
10 Nineteenth-Century Music Review
humour has been variously interpreted as a smoke-screen for his own technical 
inadequacies, a Dadaist anti-Art gesture, the practical jokery of an incorrigible fu-
miste, or a means of maintaining a stance of ironic detachment from the spiritual 
crises of his time.
 There may be some truth in all of these, but they [sic] only partial explanations 
of an art in which sense and nonsense, seriousness and humour, mystery and mys-
tification co-exist.33
Quite so; and Satie maintains this co-existence by the method first developed for 
the EMAJC. That method consists of three parallel operations, three arguments 
that must be conducted simultaneously. It is their simultaneity that lends Satie’s 
style its peculiar air of impenetrability.
The first of these three operations is an assertion of absolute value that is not 
supported by any rational argument. An unreasoned affirmation of authority 
coupled with an evocation of immortality are the keys to this assertion. Thus 
the Parcier of the EMAJC attributes to himself an absolute authority over the 
Church, and speaks in the name of the Eternal; similarly, Erik Satie takes for 
himself the right to say who is a great composer and who is not, and to grant 
immortality to his chosen ones.
The second of the three parallel operations is an undermining of the authority 
that is affirmed in the first operation. This undermining is quite simply conducted 
by irony; Satie shows, through ironic conformism, that anyone who takes such 
authority seriously is ridiculous (and that includes Satie himself). It is this 
operation that brings Satie close to Dada.
And the third operation, the least visible but the most important, is an indirect 
and empirical demonstration that we believe in the absolute value affirmed in 
the first operation; we believe in spite of the irrational and ridiculous nature of 
that belief proved in the second operation.
In short: the affirmation of absolute value; proof that it is ridiculous to believe 
in absolute value; and finally, a demonstration that, ridiculous though it is, we, 
like Satie, believe.
I do not have the space to develop the analogy here, but the closest parallel to 
this aesthetic of the irrational absolute known to me is Mallarmé’s. Many critics, 
the most thorough of them being Bertrand Marchal in La Religion de Mallarmé,34 
exploring the geography of Mallarmé’s idealism, have shown how, using, like 
Satie, religion as a model or metaphor, Mallarmé situates the artist’s ideal 
beyond the rational, beyond accessibility to scientific proof. He justifies belief 
in it only empirically, by demonstrating that audience behaviour always implies 
that we do in fact believe. For Mallarmé as for Satie, the primary evidence for the 
immortality of art is to be found in our response to it. We receive art as immortal; 
therefore, it must be taken as immortal. The irrationality of this belief is not a 
reason to refuse it; it is a reason to limit the dominion of the rational. Where Satie 
differs from Mallarmé is in the force of his determination to attack those who 
would extend that dominion: the critics, the ‘pions’, the pedagogues.
How does the concept of truth fare in these operations? Music, to the former 
Parcier of the EMAJC, remains true in the same way that religion is true. Any 
attempt (unless it be ironic) to assert or impose its truth leads straight into the trap 
of inquisition, which plays into the hands of its enemies, the critics and pontiffs. 
But to deny that we receive music as truth is cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s 
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face. If I may rehearse the paradox one last time: Dada is quite right to tell us that 
there is no Truth in Art. Yet it is obvious that in practice, we all (including Satie) 
believe in the truth of Beethoven just as firmly (and just as unjustifiably, and for 
the same reasons) as we believe in Beethoven’s individuality; and this belief in an 
individual truth is inseparable, in the end, from a more obscure but undeniable 
faith in the individuality of music, and in a certain kind of ‘truth’ in art (if I 
may borrow Satie’s scare quotes) … . The only way forward, for Erik Satie, is 
to play one’s faith in music against one’s awareness of the problematic nature 
of that faith. The result, according to the stage of the game, can be vexatious, 
self-destructive, distressingly ironic, satisfyingly comic, or serenely beautiful. 
My hope, as I continue my research on Satie, is that I will be able to show how 
his music passes through these five stages; and to explain how his words propel 
his music, and seem able to accompany it through all of those stages – even, 
perhaps, the last.
